Introduction
The proposed Basel III reforms seek to require banks to more appropriately capitalise their exposures to Central Counterparties (CCPs), including both trade and default fund exposures to Committee has previously identified that the regulatory capital treatment for counterparty credit risk (CCR) was insufficient in a number of areas and that CCPs were not widely used to clear derivatives trades. With respect to CCPs, the Committee has been working to give effect to the creation of incentives for banks to increase the use of CCPs, while ensuring that the risk arising from banks' exposures to CCPs is adequately capitalised.
Where a bank acts as a clearing member of a CCP, either for its own purposes or as a financial intermediary between a client and a CCP, a risk weight of 2% must be applied to the clearing bank's trade exposure to the CCP in respect of OTC derivatives, exchange traded derivative transactions and Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs). The 2% risk weight for trade exposures also applies where the clearing member guarantees that the client will not suffer any loss due to changes in the value of its transactions in the event of a CCP default.
1 A consultant to the JSE from Financial Chaos Theory (www.quantonline.co.za) 2 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs206.pdf 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf Basel III allows 3 methods in estimating the exposure of a bank to any counterparty: the Internal Model Method (IMM); the Standardised Method (SM) and the Current Exposure Method (CEM).
However, Basel III only allows the CEM when estimating a bank's exposure to a CCP. This short note discusses the CEM and points to a possible discrepancy in the methodologies when excluding and including netting sets.
Default Fund Exposures
Default funds make CCPs safer from a systemic point of view, as they are used to mutualise losses when a CM defaults. In addition, default funds are frequently an important source of collateral that would be used to raise liquidity in the event of a participant default. Although CCPs have different waterfall structures to absorb and mutualise losses, the general order is the following:
a. posted collateral of the defaulted CM;
b. default fund contribution of the defaulted CM;
c. default fund contribution of the CCP; and d. default fund contributions of non-defaulting CMs.
The fact that each CCP can set the level of its financial resources (margin and default funds) calls for a risk-sensitive approach that capitalises the default funds' exposure to each CCP according to the risk that the CM is facing 4 .
To calculate the capital requirements for the default fund exposures, there are three steps:
Step 1 -Calculation of the "hypothetical capital" (KCCP) 5 
;
Step 2 -Calculation of aggregate capital requirements;
Step 3 -Allocation of aggregate capital requirements to individual clearing members.
This document only entails step 1.
Quantification of Risk
There is now some debate in relation to the quantification of risk and implementation. 
Exposure at Default
Counterparty credit risk is the risk that the counterparty to a financial contract will default prior to the expiration of the contract and will not make all the payments required by the contract. . In general EAD can be seen as an estimation of the extent to which a bank may be exposed to a counterparty in the event of, and at the time of, that counterparty's default i.e., counterparty credit risk. EAD is equal to the current monetary amount outstanding in case of fixed exposures like term loans.
What will happen in practice is the following: If a counterparty in a derivative contract defaults, the CM must close out its position with the defaulting counterparty. To determine the loss arising from the counterparty's default, it is convenient to assume that the CM enters into a similar contract with another counterparty in order to maintain its market position. Since the CM's market position is unchanged after replacing the contract, the loss is determined by the contract's replacement cost at the time of default [ZP 07].
If the contract value is negative for the CM at the time of default, the CM  closes out the position by paying the defaulting counterparty the market value 7 (also known as the mark-to-market) of the contract;
 enters into a similar contract with another counterparty and receives the market value of the contract; and
• has a net loss of zero.
If the contract value is positive for the bank at the time of default, the CM
• closes out the position, but receives nothing from the defaulting counterparty;
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exposure_at_default 7 Note that the market value or mark-to-market (MtM) is its current value, however, for an instrument that is margined on a daily basis (e.g., exchange traded derivatives) the MtM is the variation margin flow from the previous day to today.
• enters into a similar contract with another counterparty and pays the market value of the contract; and
• has a net loss equal to the contract's market value.
Thus, the credit exposure of a CM that has a single derivative contract with a counterparty is the maximum of the contract's market value and zero.
The Current Exposure Method
The Basel documentation states: "Banks who do not have approval to apply the internal models method may use the Current Exposure Method." The Current Exposure Method (CEM) is used in determining the Exposure at Default (EAD) for a portfolio of instruments. The EAD is then used in determining the hypothetical capital. How do we determine the EAD using the CEM?
Definition of Current Exposure: The current exposure is defined as the amount at risk should the counterparty default now and is normally assumed to be the market value also called the mark-to-
Definition of CEM: An investor's total exposure, under the current exposure method, is equal to the replacement cost of all marked to market contracts currently in the money, plus the credit exposure risk of potential changes in future prices or volatility of the underlying asset 8 .
Basel II states: "Under the Current Exposure Method, banks must calculate the current replacement cost by marking contracts to market, thus capturing the current exposure without any need for estimation, and then adding a factor (the "add-on") to reflect the potential future exposure over the remaining life of the contract." We can state this differently: the CEM relies on the VaR methodology, and it has two components: the Current Exposure (CE) which is the current mark-to- contract. In contrast to Basel I, Basel II and III allow for collateral deduction in the CEM. However, note that non-cash collateral is subjected to a type-dependant haircut [Tu 10].
Mathematically, we state this as follows (1) where  = the current replacement cost (mark-to-market or variation margin that has to be paid by CM)  = the amount for potential future exposure (PFE). This term will include netting if it is allowed  = the volatility adjusted collateral amount
We will now scrutinise equation (1) and implement it practically.
EAD without Netting 11
The Basel II accord (paragraph 92(i) page 274) states the following:
Stated differently: If counterparty credit risk is not mitigated in any way, the maximum loss that the CM can suffer, equals the sum of the contract-level credit exposures. This means we must determine the EAD for a particular CM by taking all the individual contracts that this CM clears, into account where netting or offsets are not allowed at all.
11 Note that "netting" under Basel II is similar to the definition of "offset" for a portfolio of derivatives trades on the JSE i.e., for Class Spread Groups and Series Spread Groups as defined in the Safex Margining Technical Spec V3.03 found at http://www.jse.co.za/Markets/Equity-Derivatives-Market/Risk-management.aspx#Margin
Let's assume that the total portfolio of trades cleared by this CM consists of instruments. Now, recall from section 3 that the credit exposure of a CM is the maximum of the contract's market value and zero. We are only interested in cash flows where the CM has to pay the variation margin (MtM) to another CM. We then define the CM's exposure at default as follows
where
Equation (3) is the Exposure at Default for the -th instrument in the portfolio. This is just equation
(1) written in terms of Safcom data (extracted from Nuclears). In equation (3) we further define  = mark-to-market (variation margin) of the -th instrument in the portfolio. Please note that the variation margin paid by a CM to Safcom, has a negative sign in the files obtained from Nuclears. We only take contracts into account where the CM pays margin to Safcom The first term on the left hand side of equation (3) is [ ] This implies, the only trades taken into account are those with a credit risk to the CM i.e., trades where the CM has to pay variation margin to the clearing house (Safcom in South Africa). However, when we add the (the second term in equation (3)), we take all trades into account. In essence, this is a conservative view where we assume that all trades have the potential in moving against the CM over time.
Let's look at a specific example taken from actual trades on 1 March 2011. This is set out in Table   1 . These are all equity derivative instruments on the books of a particular CM.
By applying equations (2) and (3) we determine the EAD for this clearing member equal to R212,123.00 for these 20 instruments. The following holds for :
.
We currently have as set out in the newest document. determines the ratio of long contracts to short contracts. Thus, the total credit exposure created by all transactions in a netting set (i.e., those under the jurisdiction of the netting agreement) is reduced to the maximum of the net portfolio value and zero such that
where .
We now have ∑
and the complement of is
where is the mark-to-market (variation margin) for the -th instrument in the netting set.
is the net replacement cost or the total variation margin paid by the CM. If the CM receives variation margin Furthermore we have
with the initial margin (IMR) or collateral held against the -th instrument. The second term is the positive cash flow (variation margin) a CM receives from the mark-to-market of this instrument. 
can be positive or negative. The following holds
We now define as follows (using equations (8), (9) and (11)),
In essence it is the percentage of longs to shorts in a portfolio or percentage of variation margin paid to Safcom versus the total gross variation margin cash flow. It is a measure of the amount of offset (or netting) allowed in a particular netting set. As an example, let's assume that .
From equation (3) we then have and an offset of 49% will be allowed.
Let's look at an example where we use the same data shown in Table 1 . We now assume we can net across all 20 instruments in this portfolio. The results are given in Table 2 .
Basel Netting versus Safcom Offsets
Netting should be implemented in a similar way to the offsets that are currently achieved through the JSE's portfolio margining system. This means we need to go down to client level and netting will only be allowed per client, and only for the groups of instruments as defined by the JSE. In practice this means a client's trades will only be netted if those instruments are allowed to have offset margins in the margining system e.g., calendar spreads can be netted and a EURZAR contract can be netted against a USDZAR contract. However, there is no netting between a USDZAR and an ALSI contract or between most single name futures. Table 2 shows the EAD for this set of instruments is equal to zero. Netting can thus reduce the EAD substantially.
If there are netting sets in the total portfolio for a particular CM, the total EAD for this CM is given by ∑
with given in equation (5) being the EAD for a particular netting set -group of instruments for a particular client. Further we need the total PFE or add-on for a particular CM defined by
where is given in equation (4) being the add-on for netting set
Discrepancy between Methodologies
The way the Basel accord prescribes the CEM has a discrepancy. There is no continuous mapping in going from excluding netting to a netting methodology -going from estimating the EAD as described in section 5 to the methodology set out in section 6. This is explained through the following data set. Table 4 . However, if we use the methodology described in section 6, but we set NGR=100%
(i.e., we exclude any netting), we estimate the EAD = R22,711,516 (see Table 5 ). This is far from zero. 
Conclusion
In this short note we discussed the current exposure method as set out in the Basel II and III accords. We explained the CEM when we exclude and include netting. Also emphasised were the similarities between the JSE's definition of "offset margins" and "netting sets." We further highlighted a discrepancy between the methodologies when we incorporate and exclude netting across instruments as defined in the Basel accord.
